Denial of passport due to criminal case clear violation, rules SC

K RAVEENDRAN, IPA, January 6.2026 : Judicial pronouncements are expected to guide administrative behaviour, yet the persistence of such disputes suggests that dissemination and internalisation of legal principles within departments remain inadequate. Training, clear guidelines, and accountability mechanisms are often missing or poorly implemented.

The Supreme Court’s judgment affirming that the mere pendency of criminal cases does not disentitle a citizen from obtaining a passport carries significance well beyond the narrow facts that triggered the ruling. At one level, the verdict reiterates settled law. The right to travel abroad, subject to reasonable restrictions, flows from the broader guarantee of personal liberty, and any curtailment of that right must be grounded in clear statutory authority and justified by compelling state interest. Pending criminal proceedings do not amount to a conviction, nor do they extinguish the presumption of innocence that lies at the heart of the criminal justice system.

(Ed: Background of the case: On December 19, 2025, the Supreme Court held that the mere pendency of criminal cases does not automatically prevent a citizen from obtaining or renewing a passport, as the right to travel abroad is an integral part of the fundamental right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that passport authorities cannot impose a blanket denial based solely on pending proceedings; any restriction on travel must be proportional, based on specific grounds, and subject to judicial oversight. The Bench, comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Augustine George Masih, underscored that liberty under the Constitution “is not a gift of the State but its first obligation,” including the freedom to move, travel, and pursue livelihood.

The case concerned Mahesh Kumar Agarwal, who had been issued an ordinary passport in August 2013. During its validity, he faced two legal matters: an NIA case in Jharkhand involving allegations of extortion and funding a proscribed organisation, and a CBI coal block case in Delhi, where he was convicted and sentenced to four years’ imprisonment, later suspended by the Delhi High Court pending appeal. Both courts had imposed travel restrictions, directing him to deposit his passport and not leave India without permission.

As his passport neared expiry, Agarwal sought renewal. The NIA court in Ranchi granted permission for renewal under strict conditions—he could renew the passport but could not travel abroad without prior court approval. The Delhi High Court also held that there was no legal basis to deny a standard ten-year renewal, though it retained travel restrictions. Despite these court directions, the Regional Passport Office refused renewal, relying on Section 6(2)(f) of the Passports Act, which permits denial if proceedings are pending before a criminal court. The Supreme Court set aside this refusal, clarifying that administrative discretion cannot override judicial orders and reinforcing that citizens’ rights to travel and livelihood cannot be curtailed merely due to pending cases.)

Yet the court’s intervention is telling precisely because it exposes the distance between legal principle and administrative practice, a gap that often becomes a quiet site of injustice.

The court’s reasoning, anchored in constitutional guarantees and statutory interpretation, underscores a recurring problem in governance: laws may be carefully crafted and judicially clarified, but their application on the ground is frequently shaped by discretion exercised without adequate accountability. In the case of passports, the governing framework has long recognised that denial or impounding of travel documents must be based on specific grounds, such as national security concerns or express judicial orders.

Despite this, applicants across the country have routinely faced rejection or prolonged delays solely because a criminal case, sometimes trivial or decades old, appears in police verification reports. Such administrative reflexes effectively convert accusation into punishment, imposing restrictions that the law itself does not sanction.

This pattern is not confined to passport issuance. It reflects a broader administrative culture in which officials often err on the side of denial, delay, or excessive caution, partly to avoid personal responsibility and partly due to entrenched habits. The cost of this risk-averse bureaucracy is borne by ordinary citizens. For many, a passport is not a luxury but a necessity tied to employment, education, medical treatment, or family obligations abroad. When bureaucratic discretion hardens into routine obstruction, it can derail livelihoods and life plans, often without any formal order that can be easily challenged.

The Supreme Court’s judgment implicitly acknowledges this reality. By reiterating that pending cases cannot automatically justify denial, the court is not merely restating doctrine but signalling disapproval of how that doctrine has been selectively or incorrectly applied. The emphasis on arbitrariness is crucial. Arbitrary action strikes at the rule of law, replacing predictable legal standards with subjective decision-making. When similar applicants receive different outcomes based on the whims or misunderstandings of individual officials, equality before the law becomes an empty promise.

What makes this especially troubling is that many affected individuals lack the resources or legal awareness to challenge such decisions. Administrative orders are often communicated without detailed reasoning, leaving applicants uncertain about the basis of rejection and the remedies available. The asymmetry of power between the state and the individual means that even a clearly unlawful denial may go untested for years. In this sense, the court’s ruling speaks not only to passport authorities but to a larger ecosystem of governance where rights exist in theory but are diluted in practice through procedural opacity and inertia.

The judgment also invites reflection on the relationship between criminal law and civil rights. The mere filing of a case, which may stem from political rivalry, civil disputes given criminal colour, or routine policing practices, cannot be allowed to cast a long shadow over a person’s civic entitlements. India’s criminal justice system is marked by delays, with cases often lingering for years before trial or resolution. If pendency alone were enough to justify restrictions on movement, vast sections of the population would find themselves effectively under a permanent cloud, punished not by verdict but by delay.

By reaffirming the presumption of innocence, the court reinforces a foundational constitutional value that is frequently eroded in everyday governance. This erosion does not always take dramatic forms; more often, it manifests through mundane administrative acts that cumulatively have profound consequences. The denial of a passport may seem minor compared to arrest or imprisonment, but for the individual concerned, it can be equally debilitating. The court’s insistence on adhering to established legal standards is therefore a reminder that constitutional rights are not hierarchical conveniences but interconnected guarantees that must be respected in all state action.

At the same time, the ruling exposes a systemic weakness: the lack of effective internal checks within the bureaucracy to ensure compliance with law as interpreted by courts. Judicial pronouncements are expected to guide administrative behaviour, yet the persistence of such disputes suggests that dissemination and internalisation of legal principles within departments remain inadequate. Training, clear guidelines, and accountability mechanisms are often missing or poorly implemented. In the absence of these, officials fall back on conservative interpretations that prioritise institutional safety over individual rights.

The judgment also raises questions about the role of discretion itself. Discretion is not inherently problematic; it is necessary to accommodate varied factual situations. However, discretion untethered from clear norms and oversight can easily slide into arbitrariness. The court’s intervention can be read as an attempt to re-anchor discretion within constitutional boundaries, reminding administrators that convenience or caution cannot override legality.

There is, moreover, a democratic dimension to this issue. Access to travel documents enables citizens to participate fully in an increasingly interconnected world. Restrictions imposed without legal basis can reinforce existing inequalities, privileging those with influence or resources while marginalising others. When bureaucratic decisions effectively create classes of citizens based on unproven allegations, the egalitarian promise of the Constitution is compromised.

The broader implication of the ruling lies in its potential to embolden citizens to question administrative excesses. While the judgment does not create new law, it clarifies and reinforces existing protections, making it harder for authorities to justify blanket denials. It also signals judicial willingness to scrutinise routine administrative practices that are often insulated from challenge due to their low visibility. In doing so, the court performs a vital corrective function, reaffirming that governance must operate within the contours of law, not convenience.