India on Edge as China-Bangladesh Defence Ties Deepen: Lalmonirhat Airbase Near Siliguri Corridor Raises Strategic Alarm

India on Edge as China-Bangladesh Defence Ties Deepen: Lalmonirhat Airbase Near Siliguri Corridor Raises Strategic Alarm

Agencies & KalimNews, April 18, 2025, Kolkata : India is closely analyzing a growing defence and strategic convergence between China and Bangladesh, with particular concern over a proposed plan to redevelop an abandoned airbase in Lalmonirhat—located barely 20 kilometers from the sensitive Siliguri Corridor. Intelligence inputs suggest that the airbase, long dormant since its World War II service, is now poised for revival with significant Chinese assistance and possible involvement of Pakistani firms. Though not officially acknowledged by Dhaka or Beijing, the project is widely believed to have been discussed during the recent visit of Bangladesh's interim Chief Adviser Dr. Muhammad Yunus to China in March.

The strategic location of Lalmonirhat makes this development particularly critical. Nestled in northwestern Bangladesh, the district lies adjacent to India’s Jalpaiguri and Cooch Behar districts in West Bengal. More crucially, it sits close to the Siliguri Corridor—also called the “Chicken’s Neck”—a narrow, 22-kilometre-wide land strip that serves as the only physical link between mainland India and its eight northeastern states. This corridor is flanked by Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and China, making it one of India’s most geostrategically vulnerable zones.

The proposed redevelopment of the Lalmonirhat airbase is thus being viewed by Indian defence analysts as part of a broader strategic encirclement—known as the "string of pearls"—wherein Beijing builds or upgrades infrastructure in South Asian nations to enhance its geopolitical influence and military reach. While Chinese aircraft have not yet been deployed in India's eastern neighborhood, the very possibility of such military infrastructure being developed so close to the Siliguri Corridor presents serious concerns for India’s national security.

Initial reports indicate that construction work on the Lalmonirhat airfield could begin as early as October 2025. While ostensibly civil in purpose, strategic observers note the project’s potential dual-use functionality. This includes surveillance, logistics, or rapid deployment of forces, especially if Chinese or Pakistani defence contractors are involved. India’s concern is further deepened by China's recent pledge of $350 million to expand the China Economic and Industrial Zone in Chattogram, Bangladesh’s principal port city.

Historically, Lalmonirhat’s airfield was built in 1931 during the British era and was used as a forward base in World War II for Burma operations. Since then, it has remained under the Bangladesh Air Force with no active flight operations. But with China’s technological and financial support, and growing military-to-military cooperation, the airbase may soon return to prominence—not as a relic, but as a regional outpost for power projection.

India’s concerns are not speculative. A recent research paper titled "National Image of China in Bangladesh," released in Dhaka, offers significant insights into the scope of China-Bangladesh defence cooperation. The study outlines how Beijing has transferred military technology to Bangladesh, helping establish local production capabilities in small arms, rocket launchers, and mobility platforms. Factories such as Bangladesh Ordnance Factories and Bangladesh Machine Tools Factory Ltd have reportedly benefited from these transfers.

According to the paper and corroborating sources, Bangladesh has become China’s second-largest defence customer, accounting for 11% of Chinese arms exports from 2019 to 2023. During this period, 72% of Bangladesh’s total military imports came from China. These included frigates, tanks, submarines, maritime patrol vessels, and air defence systems. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports that Bangladesh spent $2.59 billion on Chinese arms between 2010 and 2019.

Defence ties have further solidified through joint training, exercises, and high-level exchanges. In May 2024, the two countries held a historic joint military drill, underscoring the maturity of their relationship. China’s naval presence also continues to grow, with PLA Navy warships making goodwill visits to Chattogram. Notably, the first such visit after Bangladesh’s interim government assumed power occurred in October 2024, signaling continuity in defence cooperation regardless of domestic political shifts.

Bangladesh’s shift toward the China-Pakistan axis, as noted by several geopolitical observers, began in the post-1975 era following internal political upheavals. China emerged as a principal defence partner when Soviet support declined, and Dhaka sought strategic autonomy from India. A 2002 defence agreement between Beijing and Dhaka institutionalized training, joint production, and logistical cooperation. By 2014, further agreements allowed China to provide free training, military equipment, and infrastructure support, including the development of language labs and cooperation in UN peacekeeping missions.

In parallel with these developments, Pakistan is re-engaging Bangladesh at the diplomatic level after more than a decade-long pause. Pakistani Foreign Secretary Amna Baloch is visiting Dhaka from April 17, and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar will arrive on April 24. This marks the first ministerial-level contact since 2012, with multiple memoranda of understanding likely to be signed. Though Islamabad frames this as economic and diplomatic outreach, India sees the timing and context as part of a coordinated realignment that might impact regional security architecture.

In response, India is not standing still. The commissioning of Project Varsha—a highly classified naval base at Rambilli, near Visakhapatnam in Andhra Pradesh—marks a critical leap in India’s strategic deterrence. Designed to house India’s growing fleet of nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), the Rambilli base features underground pens and tunnels, allowing stealthy deployment of nuclear submarines into the Bay of Bengal, effectively eluding Chinese satellite surveillance.

This east coast stronghold mirrors China’s own facility at Hainan Island, reinforcing India's resolve to ensure second-strike nuclear capabilities as a cornerstone of its deterrent strategy. The Rambilli base, nearing operational readiness, is expected to be fully commissioned by 2026 and is modeled for scalable future expansion.

Location of Lalmonirhat (In Chocolate colour) in Bangladesh

Additionally, the commissioning of INS Aridhaman, India's third SSBN with extended range K-4 ballistic missiles, is expected later this year. Larger than its predecessors, it will significantly enhance India’s nuclear triad. A fourth SSBN is already under construction under the ₹90,000 crore Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) project, which includes plans for even larger and more powerful 13,500-tonne SSBNs.

Simultaneously, India has initiated construction of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) for conventional combat roles. The Cabinet Committee on Security cleared two SSNs in October 2024 with a budget of ₹40,000 crore, adding teeth to India’s undersea warfare capability.

On the western seaboard, India is also investing heavily in the Karwar naval base under Project Seabird. With new operational docks, air stations, dry berths, and logistics infrastructure inaugurated by Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, Karwar is being transformed into India’s largest naval facility, capable of hosting up to 50 warships and submarines upon full completion.

The base provides critical depth to India’s naval deployments vis-à-vis Pakistan and adds redundancy to its overstretched Mumbai harbor. The combination of Rambilli and Karwar projects reflects a clear doctrine shift—toward multi-front maritime readiness, dispersed deployment, and survivability under high-stakes conflict conditions.

India’s defence establishment views the proposed Lalmonirhat airbase within the broader context of regional shifts: China’s expanding footprint in South Asia, Bangladesh’s rising military assertiveness underpinned by Chinese support, and renewed Pakistan-Bangladesh engagement. These converging dynamics, particularly at a location so close to the Siliguri Corridor, are being taken with utmost seriousness.

While no official statement has been made by the Indian government, sources indicate that New Delhi is actively recalibrating its strategic planning, enhancing ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) capabilities in the northeast, and engaging diplomatically with Dhaka to maintain transparency over the Lalmonirhat project.

As the Indo-Pacific theatre grows more contested, and as China continues to project influence via infrastructure diplomacy and defence exports, India is preparing not only to guard its borders but to project credible strength—silently, steadily, and strategically.