Chinese incursion will affect the already dwindling border trade

CLAUDE ARPI, DNA: Although for centuries, the Himalayas were a natural barrier between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian subcontinent, it was also a space of exchange. It witnessed a constant flow of knowledge, traditions and goods transiting up and down from far-away places in Central Asia, China or Mongolia to the entire subcontinent.

In October 1950, China invaded Tibet and soon after the Liberation Army began occupying the high plateau; exchanges gradually stopped.

Then in 1954, the Panchsheel Agreement designated only 6 passes (in Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh) as the land ports; myriad other routes were crossed out on the Himalayan maps. The last stroke was the short border war between India and China in 1962. All bridges were then cut between the plateau and the Indian plains. With a new neighbour obsessed with grabbing ever more territory, India’s age-old relation with lands across the Himalayas came to an end. 

Many scholars and thinkers have recently been thinking about how to soften the traditional borders again? The process has started, though it has been extremely slow.

In 1991, a Memorandum on Resumption of Border Trade was signed by India and China; in a first phase, an overland trade route was reopened between the Tibet Autonomous Region and Lipukekh-la (‘la’ means pass in Tibetan) in the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand. In 1994, the same facilities were extended to Shipki-la in Kinnaur district in Himachal Pradesh.

A series of trade agreements between India and China allowed residents of Tibet and Indians from the border districts to export a selected list of items.

In 2006, India and China decided to resume border trade through the historic Nathu-la in Sikkim; it had been closed for the past 44 years. With Jelep-la (via Kalimpong), the pass was traditionally the most important trade passage between Tibet, China and India.

The bilateral move had also a strategic implication as analysts believed that it signalled Beijing’s implicit recognition of Sikkim as part of India. This is however debatable. 

Many hoped that the border trade route would give a major boost to local economies and smoothen the bilateral relations between India and China. It has not really been the case for different reasons. Though smuggling of commodity goods is flourishing, the border trade remains rather small in volume. 

After President Xi Jinping met the Indian Prime Minister on the occasion of the BRICS meet in Durban, the Chinese leader stated that he placed a lot of importance on “enhancing people-to-people exchanges and cooperation, and broadening youth exchanges”.

After Durban, many thought that both governments could agree to remove the restrictions on border trade and later open the Himalayan passes to pilgrimage again. The Demchok route in Ladakh, which would allow Indian pilgrims to reach the Kailash-Manasarovar area in a relatively short time and in fairly comfortable conditions, was in many minds. 

Then the Chinese incursion, across the LAC near the Daulat Beg Oldi (DBO) in Ladakh occurred. It is not a coincidence that the Chinese ‘camp’ at DBO is located near the Karakoram pass, traditionally the transit point for the caravans between Kashmir and Central Asia.

What does it mean? The place will remained ‘disputed’ for the years and decades to come; in other words the pass will remain closed. So, will Demchok also be ‘disputed’ by China?

As a result, common men on both sides of the LAC will continue to be deprived of customary activities such as trade and pilgrimage, to which tourism could have been added. 

The writer is a French-born author settled in India.