Hardened stance - There is a marked change in India's approach towards Pakistan

Kanwal Sibal, TT, 26 October 2016: Prime Minister Narendra Modi used the BRICS summit and the Bimstec outreach at Goa in mid-October to attack Pakistan (without naming it) on the terrorism issue with unprecedented verbal vehemence. He called it the mothership of terrorism to which terrorist modules all over the world are linked. 

Terrorism, he said, has come to define the fundamental character and nature of the neighbouring country. He exhorted BRICS and Bimstec countries to stand up and act decisively against the State sponsors of terror. He warned Pakistan to mend its ways or face isolation in the civilized world. All countries in South Asia and Bimstec, he said, pursue the path of peace, development and prosperity, barring one that embraces and radiates the darkness of terrorism. He castigated Pakistan for not only sheltering terrorists but also nurturing a mindset that loudly proclaims that terrorism is justified for political gains.

Even after the Mumbai terrorist attack and numerous others, India's leader has never employed such excoriating language against Pakistan. Using two international gatherings on Indian soil to lambast Pakistan delivered a message that India was losing hope of Pakistan mending its ways and that its patience was nearing exhaustion. China's president, Xi Jinping, whose government has put its protective arm around Pakistan on the issue of terrorism even in the United Nations security council, should have understood it.

China has been opposing India's efforts to put Pakistan on the mat in the relevant UN security council committee on the case of Lashkar-e-Toiba's Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi and the Jaish-e-Mohammed chief, Masood Azhar. China does not see the absurdity of its position that more information is needed to designate Azhar as an international terrorist when his outfit had been declared a terrorist organization in 2001 by the UN. China and others are aware of Azhar's background, his connection with the hijacking of IC-814 from Kathmandu in 1999 and his safe conduct back into Pakistan from Kabul by his Taliban accomplices.

Modi has conveyed the message implicitly that China's massive investment plans for Pakistan would be jeopardized if Pakistan continues to promote terrorism and India is compelled to react more forcefully than the limited surgical strikes that were undertaken after the Uri attack. Modi's references to Balochistan should already have increased China's concerns about its pet project. China, hopefully, is realizing that mounting India-Pakistan tensions over terrorism also carry the danger of seriously destabilizing India-China relations should China decide to intervene in favour of its "iron brother" in case of a major military strike by India after being provoked by an act from Pakistan. As of now, China is resisting India's message, judging by its spokesperson's statement after Goa that Pakistan is itself a victim of terrorism and that in combating terrorism Pakistan has made great sacrifices that need recognition by the international community.

To a lesser degree, Modi's message has also relevance for Russia, which is reluctant to publicly join India to note Pakistan's terrorist affiliations. What is more, it has lately taken initiatives that give comfort to Pakistan vis-à-vis India. Its decision to ink a defence agreement with Pakistan in 2014, sell weapons and hold inopportune military exercises with it shortly after the Uri attack have touched sensitive nerves in India. One can argue that the import of these exercises should not be exaggerated, given that India conducts limited military exercises with a strategic adversary like China. The difference, of course, is that with China the exercises are part of managing a conflictual relationship. With Russia, trust and geopolitical convergence have traditionally marked India's ties. Its military outreach to Pakistan cannot but be seen negatively; it sows doubts in our mind about Russian motives and the extent to which this reflects its increased strategic understandings with China as a reaction to improving India-US relations.

Russia, it is explained, is concerned about the presence of Islamic State elements in Afghanistan and the danger they pose to Central Asia and, eventually, to Russia itself. Consequently, it feels the need to engage Pakistan rather than continue to cold-shoulder it. The weakness of this explanation is that Russia has not been unresponsive to Pakistan's efforts to reach out to it, principally to drive a wedge between Russia and India by pushing it to be more even-handed in the subcontinent and not allow its policies as a great power to be dictated by India. Already, with the limited overtures Russia has made, Pakistani commentators are talking of Pakistan joining up with China and Russia to prevent its isolation, and so on.

Russia's initiative to start quadripartite talks involving Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and itself on the regional situation around Afghanistan was not linked to the entry of IS elements in Afghanistan. India was excluded, just as the Americans excluded India from their "quad" involving themselves, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. This was more in the context of accommodating the Taliban in the power structure in Afghanistan with Pakistan's cooperation.

The Russian decision to supply weapons to Pakistan, such as attack helicopters, constituted a major political departure from earlier supplies of transport helicopters, although Russia has indirectly helped Pakistan's military capacity by providing the jet engines for the JF 17, a China-Pakistan joint venture for the production of combat aircraft. The explanation that these attack helicopters are intended to aid Pakistan in carrying out anti-terror operations is unpersuasive. The Americans use the same argument to justify the sale of F-16s to Pakistan, but are unable to persuade it to act against the Haqqani group, which targets the US forces in Afghanistan. If Pakistan will not be pressurized by the Americans to act against terrorist groups that help promote its geopolitical aims in the neighbourhood, a few Russian helicopters will not give Russia the leverage to persuade Pakistan to control the flow of terrorists from the region into Central Asia. Even China, which wields enormous influence in Pakistan, has issues with its ability to control Uighur militants operating from its territory. Russia is, therefore, hardly likely to obtain any worthwhile cooperation from Pakistan with regard to Islamic elements penetrating Central Asia from its soil.

Sergey Chemezov, a close associate of Vladimir Putin and the head of Russia's military technology conglomerate, Rostec, had clarified at Goa that there are no contracts or plans to deliver military equipment to Pakistan. This is reassuring. But by justifying the military exercises as important for targeting the IS that is spreading terror in the Middle East, India and Pakistan, he has been less comforting about the future.

Modi's broadsides on two formal occasions with major world leaders present signify a marked change of approach towards Pakistan. Boycotting the November summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Islamabad and inviting Bimstec countries instead of those of Saarc to the BRICS summit is sending a clear message about India's willingness to isolate Pakistan in the region. Having generated this kind of pressure on Pakistan, it is important that India does not relent and continues to resist any overture from Pakistan through back channels proposing a fresh start in overcoming differences. Pakistan has learnt through experience that India's staying power in pursuing a tough course towards the former is limited. The Modi government should disprove this.

The author is former foreign secretary of India sibalkanwal@gmail.com